This point means that an inclusion of essays by Chinese scholars whose voices are not mediated through the understandings of American-based or American-oriented scholars — may have enriched the volumes and the kinds of analyses they contain.
New security concerns are emerging in the Asia Pacific region as global players . Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power: Between. India as an Asia Pacific Power (Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series) [David Brewster] on unuludojez.ga *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
Many if not most of the chapters contain either prognoses about future developments in the region or recommendations for policies to be undertaken by governments. Hence readers interested in the implications for policy that emerge from the chapters will encounter a rather consistent emphasis on the consequences of processes characterizing contemporary Asia for American administrations.
Along these lines, a major emphasis in many chapters is on managing the manifold tensions actual and potential between the United States and China or other actors. In fact, many chapters include prescriptive sections that offer advice to policy-makers and decision-makers.
Yet like any policy-oriented texts, one cannot but be struck by how the chapters in the four volumes underscore how circumstances are constantly changing and have to be updated for any coherent policy to emerge. Thus perhaps the long-term significance of these volumes lies less in terms of the actual empirical details that are presented although these are important than in presenting the various analytical and theoretical frames through which the region of Asia as the globe as a whole can be understood. In fact, a great advantage of many theoretical frames that are presented and developed by the authors may be usefully applied to any future developments.
Buszynski provides introductory pieces at the beginning of each volume but these are extremely short some running to only five pages and very selective in terms of the issues or theoretical frames that are set out. The inclusion of longer integrative pieces not necessarily by Buszynski himself could have tied together the volumes in better ways and offered readers insights about the significance of the series as a whole or of each volume separately.
Along these lines, the four books give one a sense that they are readers rather than integrated edited collections.
Perhaps this was the intention of the publisher, Routledge, but readers should be aware of this shortcoming when approaching the individual books. Finally, one can ask as to the kinds of readerships that will benefit most from this series of books. The four volume series will certainly serve as a very good reference for libraries. Moreover, they can be used by researchers and advanced students as great source books for almost any analysis of contemporary Asia from the perspective of International Relations.
Indeed, the great appeal of the chapters included in the four volumes will be to audiences rooted in policy sciences, area studies or theoretical IR. In addition, since the essays can be assigned individually the volumes can be an excellent basis for assignation of text in courses and seminars.
Edited by Leszek Buszynski. London: Routledge x pp. Art 11 American and Chinese power after the financial crisis by Joseph S. This asymmetry in navies and maritime outlook, combined with the adherence to the principle of sovereignty, can make cooperation between the Southeast Asian countries incompatible. In Northeast Asia, geographical, circumstantial, experiential or constitutional as in the case of Japan constraints to the strategic ambitions and maritime outlook of these countries has also resulted in divergent regional naval strategies among the Northeast Asian powers.
Among Western nations, cooperation is the norm because countries are democratically stable, with relatively even developmental experiences, and have developed and sustained high levels of shared interdependence among themselves over the years in many aspects. Hence, in recent times, cooperation and collaboration, rather than conflict and competition, appears as the norm. There are also less mature democratic regimes in Asia-Pacific, such as Myanmar, which understandably display preference for self-reliance and sovereign rights when dealing with matters of national interests.
A third potential reason why the Asia-Pacific is seeing less naval cooperation when compared to the West is because among the Western nations, there is a much stronger appreciation of the value of naval cooperation in peacetime. Throughout European history, numerous battles have been fought at sea, and these experiences have served to hone Western naval finesse at an operational level and heighten a collective historical consciousness of sea conflict.
On the other hand, a general unfamiliarity with fighting wars at sea or dealing with maritime conflicts correlates with a lack of confidence of Asia-Pacific countries to deal with future challenges, even if these challenges also portend to opportunities for enhanced naval cooperation. The salience of peacetime cooperation has not yet been driven home so profoundly as in the West, and as a result Asia-Pacific countries might be seen as being less eager to cooperate than their Western peers. This means that existing naval equipment and tools potentially outpace the navies before navies can gain proficiency in their original operational capabilities.
Hence, naval cooperation is seen to pose an added layer of operational challenge. This strong adherence to sovereignty rises to the surface particularly when their sovereign spaces appear to be under compromise. High dependence on the seas as a source of food and energy makes the safeguarding of the marine environment a particular economic and strategic necessity for the navies on both sides. Despite growing financial and economic interdependencies, China and Japan have in recent times displayed reluctance to set aside their national interests when matters of maritime sovereignty are involved.
However, co-production efforts have not been successful, and both sides have been unable to reach an agreement  over the rights and interests for the production of natural gas . Unsettled historical legacies of Japanese aggression during the Second World War continue to remain a source for Chinese mistrust and suspicion towards Japan. Among Southeast Asian countries, national sovereignty is of great importance, as evidenced by the territorial disputes over two islands in the South China Sea.
Attempts by the claimant states to secure their presence by force have resulted in tense stand-offs. As this continues to trouble bilateral relations between the Southeast Asian nations, cooperation at the South China Sea is less likely. Southeast Asian countries are protective of the South China Seas regardless of which nation, particularly when international security arrangements appear to undermine it. It has used multilateral instruments to consolidate or complement its need to assert its national image and preserve its regional power. It has responded to the moves of other claimants in unilateral ways that have been described by the international community as both aggressive and assertive .
This is typified by the cable-cutting incident involving a Vietnamese oil and gas survey ship in the South China Seas . Northeast Asian countries have displayed general reluctance to enter into cooperative security agreements with China, even though the regional states share economic interdependence. Trade partnerships coexist along with strategic mistrust, mostly over unsettled historical legacies of the Second World War. This relationship remains the status quo for China-Japan relations. Diplomatic tensions have been heightened by the Chinese response to US actions. In , China stridently objected to the possibility of a US aircraft carrier participation in an exercise in the Yellow Sea aimed at the DPRK in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident .
As a result, international navies, including the US, have shown increasing wariness of Chinese intentions through its engagements with China in more strategic ways . In response to the changing strategic environment, Asia-Pacific countries have been strengthening their defences by modernizing and expanding their navies  at a remarkable rate. The difficulty of measuring all seven characteristics does not preclude the possibility of an arms race dynamics across the region as a whole.
Competitive action-reaction dynamics between China and Japan, China and the US, China and India, as well among the Southeast Asian countries, have reduced incentives for the countries to seek, initiate or change the regionally tense trajectory by engaging their navies bilaterally. Between the Northeast Asian countries, China and Japan are showing pronounced signs of arms racing dynamics, through their competitive and interactive acquisition and development of naval capabilities. This trend highlights the drive towards an outward-looking and assertive defence policy by Japan.
Tense arms racing dynamics can be discerned in the bilateral ties between US and China. This might potentially impact the US-led regional stability, either by blocking US access to critical areas, or by strategically undermining and displacing US naval status quo powers in the Asia-Pacific region . US spokespeople categorically deny this is only or even mainly aimed at China, of course. This has served to limit cooperation on both operational, as well as strategic levels . This has enlarged the strategic atmosphere with the introduction of more advanced competitive capabilities, and at the same time has increased the security dilemma .
Many have raised questions as to why India is investing in such expensive state of the art naval capabilities, when more immediate tensions across the India-Pakistani border appear to be taking up much of its defense resources. The benefits of the Look East Policy, particularly, the increased trade, better connectivity, greater socio-cultural links, cooperation in the area of capacity building, education, youth, etc.
The promise which ASEAN and East Asia hold for India combined with the recent Japanese and Australian quest to infuse the region with a new identity and to re-imagine the region afresh to expand the ambit of Asia Pacific indicate toward the new formulation of Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific geopolitical imagination History of the term Indo-Pacific extends back into the 19th century during the s, when it was used to identify the people inhabiting the people in the islands of Indonesia as Indo-Pacific islanders.
Therefore, the term has a long geopolitical history, even prior to the application by Haushofer, as a part of his book German Culture Politics in the Indo-Pacific Space in For him the context was clear as the Germans sought to emulate the British Empire, charted out a course for global military domination. For Haushofer, the inspiration came from the fact that on the basis of a strong naval base the British had built a global empire and the Dutch during the same period were present in the South East Asia.
Hastings, Justin V. Indeed, India could take on more responsibility in Asia, such as in peacekeeping, search and rescue, disaster relief, and providing high-value cargo escort. Pham, Quang Minh. In what follows I chart out the main parameters of the series in terms of three dimensions: empirical, theoretical, and policy orientation since they may interest readers from a variety of perspectives and disciplines. Hammes, T. Gresh, Geoffrey F.
To address the German dream to be present globally, Haushofer intended to examine the viability of such a presence in the region. The discipline of geopolitics suffered as the term invoked references to World War II and the Nazi ideology. Geopolitics began its revival in the s and the term Indo-Pacific is now being reinvigorated in the academic circles as new strategic and geopolitical constellations emerge in the wake of emergence of China. The paper intends to examine the geographical validity of this term in this section. Authors like Robert D. Kaplan, in his work Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power  argues that the Indo-Pacific entity will cater to the rising trade in the region due to the rise of China and India as a basis to establish its unity.
His basic argument is that Indo-Pacific is a bio-geographical region alluding to the similar flora and fauna from the East African Madgascar coast to the Asian lands littoral to the Pacific Japan. Secondly, for Kaplan, these regions have similar climate, the unifying climatic type is that of the Monsoons. Both claims can be put to scrutiny, the first one is specially intangible, since the bio-geographical basis is still not vigorously scrutinized to become a geographical category, the only evidence could be found in a paper published as recently as The most accepted climatic classification that is of Wladimir Koeppen which he developed from to and which by the scholars of climate is considered to be the most relevant to explain and classify the world into climatic zones.
His basic categories are A: Tropical Forest climates; hot all seasons B: Dry climates C: Warm temperate climates D: Cold forest climates E: Polar Climates H: Undifferentiated Highland climates The classification is completed with various sub-categories in each of the abovementioned categories.
Thus, the climatic classification does support the unity of Indo-Pacific as a single climatic zone. A close look at the regions littoral to the Indo-Pacific reveals that the climatic zones present on the Eastern coast of Africa are the A and B category, i.
The Indian subcontinent supports the first four A, B, C and D categories due its extremely diverse physiography. Then northwards on the Asian landmass the majority of the countries have either of the two categories i. The western coast of Australia again displays the two categories of A and B types of climate. The sub-categorization of these regions elucidates much more diverse climatic zones which exist in the Indo-Pacific. Another very prominent climatic classification used by geographers is that of C.
Warren Thornthwaite. The Indo-Pacific zonation can be discussed through this classification and it also falls short of scrutiny there. The idea can be contested on other grounds as well. Moreover, the South China Sea dispute engages most of the important regional players in the wider Indo-Pacific. The second criticism is more pointed. Is the Indo-Pacific really just code for balancing against or excluding China? The constitution of the major proponents Japan, Australia and India of the term mixed with their geographical location at three opportune junctures in the Indo-Pacific does indicate towards a tri-locking strategy against China.
This also indicates, however, that the term in its current form is a geopolitical imagination. The next section focuses on the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical imagination and the possibilities it offers to the Indian establishment.
Abe asked the Indian Parliament if it was not time for a value-based and an interests-based relationship between India and Japan. This is an intellectual, policy, and material reorientation of considerable significance for the US Yoshihara The only explanation for the term comes from the fact that regions can be geopolitical imaginations which serve the interests of a state or a particular group of states. Indo-Pacific in this sense is geopolitical imagination directed at China. In this case, the rise of China and the concerns which occur due to it in the immediate region are addressed through such regionalizations.
As expressed above the term is a geopolitical code for China. Though there are two variants to the Indo-Pacific which are currently being concretized through debate by strategic thinkers. These include issues of economic development and human security, the environment, the seabed and fisheries management, among others.